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Abstract
I present a search-based model in which money coexists with equity shares 
on a risky aggregate endowment. Agents can use equity as a means of pay-
ment, so shocks to equity prices translate into aggregate liquidity shocks 
that disrupt the mechanism of exchange. I characterize a family of optimal 
monetary policies, and ﬁ  nd that the resulting equity prices are independent 
of monetary considerations. I also study monetary policies that target a 
constant, but nonzero, nominal interest rate, and ﬁ  nd that to the extent that 
a ﬁ  nancial asset is valued as a means to facilitate transactions, the asset’s 
real rate of return will include a liquidity return that depends on monetary 
considerations. Through this liquidity channel, persistent deviations from an 
optimal monetary policy can cause the real prices of assets that can be used 
to relax trading constraints to exhibit persistent deviations from their funda-
mental values.
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
QR
14
Asset Prices, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy 
in the Search Theory of Money*
Ricardo Lagos
Associate Professor of Economics
New York University
0DQ\¿QDQFLDODVVHWVDUHKHOGQRWRQO\IRUWKHLQWULQVLF
value of the stream of consumption that they yield, but 
also for their usefulness in facilitating exchange. Con-
sider a buyer who cannot commit or be forced to honor 
debts, and who wishes to make a purchase from a seller. 
7KLVEX\HUZRXOG¿QGDQ\DVVHWWKDWLVYDOXDEOHWRWKH
seller (e.g., an equity share, a bond, money) helpful in 
carrying out the transaction. For example, the buyer 
could settle the transaction on the spot by using the 
asset directly as a means of payment. In some modern 
WUDQVDFWLRQVRIWHQWLPHVWKHEX\HUZRXOGXVHD¿QDQFLDO
asset to enter a repurchase agreement with the seller, 
or as collateral to borrow the funds needed to pay the 
seller. Once stripped from the subsidiary contractual 
complexities, the essence of these transactions is that 
the asset helps the untrustworthy buyer to obtain what 
KHZDQWVIURPWKHVHOOHU,QWKLVVHQVHPDQ\¿QDQFLDO
assets are routinely employed in the exchange process 
and play a role akin to a medium of exchange. That is, 
they provide liquidity—the term that monetary theorists 
use to refer to the usefulness of an asset in facilitating 
transactions.
)LQDQFLDODVVHWVDUHVXEMHFWWRSULFHÀXFWXDWLRQV
resulting from aggregate shocks, so to the extent that 
these assets serve as a source of liquidity, shocks to their 
prices will translate into aggregate liquidity shocks that 
disrupt the mechanism of exchange and the ensuing allo-
FDWLRQV5HFHQWGHYHORSPHQWVLQ¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWVKDYH
UHQHZHGHFRQRPLVWV¶LQWHUHVWLQWKHLGHDWKDWÀXFWXDWLRQV
in asset prices can disrupt the exchange process in some 
key markets, and through this channel, propagate to the 
macroeconomy.
Much of the policy advice offered to central banks is 
framed in terms of simple interest-rate feedback rules 
loosely motivated by a particular class of models where 
WKHSUHHPLQHQWIULFWLRQLVDVSHFL¿FW\SHRIUHGXFHGIRUP
nominal rigidity. Such policy recommendations are 
based on the premise that the primary goal of monetary 
policy is to mitigate the effects of these rigidities. With 
no room or role for a notion of liquidity (and typically 
even no meaningful role for money), this conventional 
view that dominates policy circles has failed to offer 
UHOHYDQWSROLF\JXLGDQFHLQWKHPLGVWRIWKHUHFHQW¿-
nancial crisis. I interpret this failure as an indication that 
the consensus stance toward monetary policy, with its 
theoretical focus on sticky-price frictions and its imple-
*This article was prepared for the Proceedings of the Thirty-fourth Annual 
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mentation emphasis on ad hoc feedback interest-rate 
rules, is too narrow in that it neglects the fundamental 
frictions that give rise to a demand for liquidity. 
In this article I present a dynamic equilibrium mi-
crofounded monetary asset-pricing framework with 
multiple assets and aggregate uncertainty regarding 
liquidity needs, and discuss the main normative and 
positive policy implications of the theory. The broad 
view that emerges from explicitly modeling the role of 
money and other liquid assets in the exchange process 
is that of a monetary authority that seeks to provide 
the private sector with the liquidity needed to conduct 
PDUNHWWUDQVDFWLRQV6SHFL¿FDOO\,VWDWHDQGH[SODLQ
three propositions that answer the following questions: 
How should monetary policy be conducted in order to 
mitigate the adverse effects of shocks to the valuations 
RIWKH¿QDQFLDODVVHWVWKDWSURYLGHOLTXLGLW\WRWKHSUL-
vate sector? What are the implications for asset prices 
of deviating from the optimal monetary policy? Are 
such deviations capable of causing real asset prices to 
be above their fundamental values for extended periods 
of time? 
Model
In order to address the questions just posed, in this sec-
tion I outline a bare-bones model that encompasses the 
key economic mechanisms.
1 The model combines ele-
ments of the asset-pricing model of Lucas (1978) with 
elements of the model of monetary exchange of Lagos 
and Wright (2005). Time is discrete and the horizon 
LQ¿QLWH7KHUHLVD[,] 01FRQWLQXXPRILQ¿QLWHO\OLYHG
agents. Each time period is divided into two subperiods 
where different activities take place. There are three non-
storable and perfectly divisible consumption goods at 
each date: fruit, general goods, and special goods. Fruit 
and general goods are homogeneous goods, whereas 
special goods come in many varieties. The only durable 
commodity in the economy is a set of Lucas trees. The 
QXPEHURIWUHHVLV¿[HGDQGHTXDOWRWKHQXPEHURI
agents. Trees yield a random quantity  xt of fruit in the 
second subperiod of every period t. Each tree yields 
the same amount of fruit as every other tree, so  xt is an 
aggregate shock. The realization of  xt becomes known 
at the beginning of period tZKHQDJHQWVHQWHUWKH¿UVW
subperiod). Production of fruit is entirely exogenous: no 
resources are utilized, and it is not possible to affect the 
output at any time. The motion of  xt will be taken to fol-
ORZD0DUNRYSURFHVVGH¿QHGE\LWVWUDQVLWLRQIXQFWLRQ
Fxx (,)   Pr( | ). xx x x tt     1 )RUHDFK¿[HGx, Fx (, ) 
is a distribution function with support   (, ) . 0
In each subperiod, every agent is endowed with n
units of time which can be employed as labor services. 
In the second subperiod, each agent has access to a 
linear production technology that transforms labor ser-
YLFHVLQWRJHQHUDOJRRGV,QWKH¿UVWVXESHULRGHDFK
agent has access to a linear production technology that 
transforms his own labor input into a particular variety 
of the special good that he himself does not consume. 
This specialization is modeled as follows. Given two 
agents i and j drawn at random, there are three possible 
events. The probability that i consumes the variety of 
special good that j produces but not vice versa (a single 
coincidence) is denoted D. Symmetrically, the prob-
ability that j consumes the special good that i produces 
but not vice versa is also D. In a single-coincidence 
meeting, the agent who wishes to consume is the buyer,
and the agent who produces, the seller. The probability 
that neither wants what the other can produce is 12  D,
with D 12 /.  Fruit and general goods are homogeneous 
and hence consumed (and, in the case of general goods, 
also produced) by all agents.
,QWKH¿UVWVXESHULRGDJHQWVSDUWLFLSDWHLQDdecen-
tralized market where trade is bilateral (each meeting 
is a random draw from the set of pairwise meetings), 
and the terms of trade are determined by bargaining (a 
take-it-or-leave-it offer by the buyer, for simplicity). The 
specialization of agents over consumption and produc-
tion of the special good, combined with bilateral trade, 
gives rise to a double-coincidence-of-wants problem 
LQWKH¿UVWVXESHULRG,QWKHVHFRQGVXESHULRGDJHQWV
trade in a centralized market. Agents cannot make bind-
ing commitments, and trading histories are private in a 
way that precludes any borrowing and lending between 
people, so all trade—in both the centralized and decen-
tralized markets—must be quid pro quo.
Each tree has outstanding one durable and perfectly 
divisible equity share that represents the bearer’s own-
ership and confers him the right to collect the fruit 
GLYLGHQGV7KHUHLVDVHFRQG¿QDQFLDODVVHWPRQH\
which is intrinsically useless (it is not an argument of 
any utility or production function), and unlike equity, 
ownership of money does not constitute a right to collect 
any resources. Money is issued by a “government” that 
1The analysis that follows is based on Lagos (2009, 2010). See also Lagos 
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at t = 0 commits to a monetary policy represented by a 
sequence of positive real-valued functions, {}. Ptt 

0  Giv-
en an initial stock of money, M0 0 > , a monetary policy 
induces a money supply process, {}, Mtt 

0  via Mt+ = 1
Pt
t
t xM () ,  where  xt denotes a history of realizations of 
fruit dividends through period t, i.e.,  xx x x t
tt   ( , ,..., ). 10
The government injects or withdraws money via lump-
sum transfers or taxes in the second subperiod of every 
period, i.e., along every sample path, MM T tt t + =+ 1 ,
where Tt is the lump-sum transfer (or tax, if negative). 
All assets are perfectly recognizable, cannot be forged, 
and can be traded among agents in both the central-
ized and decentralized markets. At t = 0 each agent 
is endowed with a s
0 equity shares and a m
0 XQLWVRI¿DW
money.
Let the utility function for special goods, u:, \\  
and the utility function for fruit, U :, \\    be con-
tinuously differentiable, bounded by B on , increasing, 
and strictly concave, with uU () () . 00 0 ==  Let n  be 
the utility from working nKRXUVLQWKH¿UVWVXESH-
riod. Also, suppose there exists q* (, )   0 GH¿QHGE\
  uq () , * 1  with qn * .   Let the utility for general goods, 
and the disutility from working in the second subperiod, 
be linear. The agent prefers a consumption and labor 
sequence  {,,, ,} qncyh ttttt t 

0  over another sequence {,  qt
 ncyh tt tt t ,,,} 

0 if




















tt tt t uq n Uc y h [( ) ( ) ] ,    0
where E (,) , , 01 qt  and nt  are the quantities of special 
goods consumed and produced in the decentralized 
market, ct denotes consumption of fruit,  yt consump-
tion of general goods, and ht the hours worked in the 
second subperiod. Here,  Et is an expectations operator 
conditional on the information available to the agent at 
timetGH¿QHGZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHPDWFKLQJSUREDELOLWLHV
and the probability measure induced by F.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the in-
dividual optimization problem that each agent faces, 
DQGWKHQGH¿QHDQHTXLOLEULXPIRUWKLVHFRQRP\,WLV
convenient to analyze the decisions that an agent has to 
make in any given period by working backward from the 
HQGRIWKHSHULRG,¿UVWFRQVLGHUWKHDJHQW¶VSUREOHPLQ
the centralized market, I then explain the determination 
RIWKHWHUPVRIWUDGHLQDELODWHUDOPHHWLQJDQG¿QDOO\
I provide an expression for the agent’s value function 
when he enters the decentralized market before the 
round of bilateral trade. Let att
s
t
m aa = (, )  denote the 
portfolio of an agent who holds at
s shares and at
m units 
of money. Let Wtt () a  and Vtt () a  be the maximum at-
tainable expected discounted utility of an agent when 
he enters the centralized and decentralized markets, 
respectively, at time t with portfolio at. Then, 
(1) Wtt () a =
      max { ( ) ( )}
,,, cyh tttt




   
1
11 E







m ++ + ++ II 11








tt t xa a T w h
00 1    ch n tt t ,, . 0 a
That is, when he enters the centralized market of period t
with portfolio at, the agent chooses consumption of fruit 
() , ct  consumption of general goods () , yt  labor supply 
() , ht  and an end-of-period portfolio () at+1  in order to 
maximize his expected discounted utility. Fruit is used 
as the numéraire: wt is the relative price of the general 
good, It
s is the (ex-dividend) price of a share, and 1/It
m
is the dollar price of fruit.
Next, consider a meeting in the decentralized mar-
ket of period t between a buyer with portfolio at  and a 
seller with portfolio   at. Let [ , (,) , (,) ] qtt aa p aa   denote 
the terms at which a buyer who owns portfolio a trades 
with a seller who owns portfolio   a, where qt(,) aa  \  
is the quantity of special good traded, and  pa a t(,)  =
[ (,) , (,) ] pp t
s
t
m aa aa  \\     is the transfer of assets 
IURPWKHEX\HUWRWKHVHOOHUWKH¿UVWDUJXPHQWLVWKH
transfer of equity). As mentioned earlier, the terms of 
trade, (, ) , qtt p  are determined by the buyer, who makes 
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. In order to choose 
his offer, the buyer solves
max [ ( ) ( ) ( )]
, qtt t





     s.t.  Wq W tt t t tt () ( ) .  ap a   
The constraints  pa tt   specify that the buyer cannot 
spend more assets than he owns, and the other con-
straint ensures that the buyer’s offer is acceptable to the Asset Prices, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy
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seller. Let O Ott
s
t








m w  (/ ) . 1  Intuitively, Ot
s is the period t real 
cum-dividend value of equity, and Ot
m is the period t
real value of a unit of money, both expressed in terms 
of period t general goods. The bargaining outcome is as 
follows. If O Ott q a  *,the buyer buys qq t = * in exchange 
for a vector  pt of assets with real value O OO O tt tt q pa  * .
Otherwise, the buyer pays the seller  pa tt =  in exchange 
for qtt t = O O a . Hence, the quantity of special good ex-
changed is min( , ) ( ), * O OO O tt tt qq aa   and the real value 
(expressed in terms of general goods) of the portfolio 
used as payment is O OO O tt t t tt q paa a (,) ( ) .  =
With the bargaining solution, the value of search to 
an agent who enters the decentralized market of period 
t with portfolio at can be written as
9: WW W W WW      DD D    O O
where  ^> @  ` [ XT[ T[   D  is the expected gain 
from trade in the decentralized market. Substitute the 
budget constraint (1) and Vtt () a  into the right side of 




tt t t t t
t
t ct
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 







           E(: WW W W W >    @ `   O O    DD
where WO tt
m
t T =  and I Itt
s
t
m = (, ) . II  This expression 
provides a simple recursive representation of the 
maximum attainable expected discounted utility of an 
agent who enters the centralized market of period t with 
portfolio at.
Given a process {}, Mtt 

0  a (symmetric) equilibrium 
is a plan {} , ctt t ,a 

10  pricing functions {,}, wtt t I I 

0  and 
bilateral terms of trade {, } qtt t p 

0 such that: (i) given 
prices and the bargaining protocol, {} ctt t ,a 

10  solves 
the agent’s optimization problem on the right side of 
(2); (ii) the bilateral terms of trade are qq tt t = min( , ) * O O a
and O Ott t q p = ; and (iii) the centralized market clears, 
i.e., cx tt = , and at
s
+ = 1 1. The equilibrium is monetary
if It
m > 0 for all t, and in this case the money-market-
clearing condition is aM t
m
t ++ = 11 . The market-clearing 





  11 0 {, , } , xM tt t 1 10 

wU x tt   1/ ( ), and once {} I Itt 

0 has been found, {} qtt 
  0
{} O Ott t p 
  0 {min( , )} , * tt q 






t M ++ 11  is the real value of the equilibrium portfolio 
that each agent brings into the decentralized market of 
period t +1. Therefore, given a money supply process 
{}, Mtt 

0  and letting L t ()    1 [ ( )], 1 1     t  a mon-
etary equilibrium can be summarized by a sequence 








t ( ) [ ( ) ( )( )] IE I  11 1 1
     Ux EL Ux tt
m
tt t t
m () [ ( ) ( ) ] IE I  11 1






  0 0 EI






   01 0 EI
The last two conditions are the transversality conditions 
IRUHTXLW\DQGPRQH\7KH¿UVWDQGVHFRQGFRQGLWLRQV
are the Euler equations for equity and money, respec-
tively. The fact that both assets can be used as a medium 
of exchange in bilateral trades implies that the usual 
stochastic discount factor is augmented by the liquidity 
factor L t () ,  1  which captures the liquidity value of 
the asset, i.e., the degree to which the asset is useful as 
a medium of exchange, at the margin.
Normative Results: Optimal 
Policy and Implementation
The Pareto optimal allocation in this environment can 
be found by solving the problem of a social planner who 
wishes to maximize average (equally weighted across 
agents) expected utility. The planner chooses a plan 
{, , , ,} cqnyh ttttt t 

0 subject to the feasibility constraints, 
i.e., 0 cd tt , yh tt  , and 0 qn tt  for those agents 
ZKRDUHPDWFKHGLQWKH¿UVWVXESHULRGRISHULRGt and 
qn tt == 0 for those agents who are not. Under these 
FRQVWUDLQWVWKHSODQQHU¶VSUREOHPFRQVLVWVRI¿QGLQJD
feasible plan {,} cq tt t 

0  such that for all feasible plans 
{,} ,  cq tt t 

0




















tt t uq q Uc {[( ) ] ( ) } .   0
Here, E0 denotes the expectation with respect to the FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS
QR
18
probability measure over sequences of dividend real-
izations induced by F. The solution to the planner’s 




In equilibrium, market clearing implies cx tt = , i.e., 
HTXLOLEULXPFRQVXPSWLRQRIIUXLWLVDWWKHHI¿FLHQWOHYHO
However, the equilibrium allocation has qq t  *, which 
may hold with strict inequality in some states. That is, 
equilibrium consumption and production in the decen-
WUDOL]HGPDUNHWPD\EHEHORZWKHLUHI¿FLHQWOHYHOV,Q
this context, the role of monetary policy is to ensure that 
the value of money is large enough to allow for qq t = *
with probability one, for all t.
To state the results that follow, it will be convenient 
to introduce the following notion of nominal interest 
rate. Imagine that there existed an additional asset in 
this economy, an illiquid nominal bond, i.e., a one-period 
risk-free government bond that pays a unit of money 
in the centralized market and which cannot be used in 
decentralized exchange. Let It
ndenote the price of this 
asset. In equilibrium, this price must satisfy    Ux tt
n () I
EI EU x tt t
m [( ) ] .   11  Since II t
n
t
m /  is the money price of a 
nominal bond, the (net) nominal interest rate in a mon-
etary equilibrium is itt
m
t


















PROPOSITION 1. Equilibrium quantities in a monetary 
equilibrium are Pareto optimal if and only if it = 0 with
probability one for all t, in the monetary equilibrium.
Proposition 1 establishes the optimality of the Fried-
man rule—Milton Friedman’s (1969) prescription that 
monetary policy should induce a zero nominal interest 
rate in order to lead to an optimal allocation of resources. 
The proof is as follows. The equilibrium allocation is ef-
¿FLHQWLIDQGRQO\LIqq tt () , *   and this equality holds 
if and only if t q  *, i.e., if and only if the real value 
of the equilibrium portfolio, t, is at least as large as 
the real liquidity needs, represented by q*.The nomi-
nal interest rate, it, is zero if and only if L t () ,    1 1
and this equality holds if and only if t q  *. Hence, 
qq tt () *   if and only if it = 0. Intuitively, the cost of 
producing real balances is zero to the government, so the 
optimum quantity of real balances should be such that 
WKHPDUJLQDOEHQH¿W²ZKLFKLQHTXLOLEULXPHTXDOVWKH
marginal cost, it—is zero to the economic agents.
I next turn to the question of implementation: Which 
monetary policies are consistent with a monetary equi-
librium in which the nominal interest rate is at its optimal 
target level of zero? The following result addresses the 
issue of (weak) implementation by characterizing a 
family of monetary policies that are consistent with an 
equilibrium with it = 0 for all t.








s* =   Ux x tt
s
t () ( ) , * I and 7 be the set of dates for 
which q t
s **  O 0 holds with probability St > 0. As-
sume that inf . tt   7 S 0 A monetary equilibrium with 
it = 0 with probability one for all t exists under a de-
terministic money supply process {} Mtt 

0 if and only if 












E 0 if 7  .
Conditions (4) and (5) are rather unrestrictive asymptotic 
FRQGLWLRQV7KH¿UVWRQHUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHPRQH\VXS-
ply converges to zero. The second condition requires 
that asymptotically, on average over the set of dates 
7 ZKHQ¿DWPRQH\SOD\VDQHVVHQWLDOUROHWKHJURZWK
rate of the money supply must be at least as large as 
the discount factor. Versions of this result have been 
proven by Wilson (1979) and Cole and Kocherlakota 
(1998) for deterministic competitive economies with 
cash-in-advance constraints that are imposed on agents 
every period with probability one.
Proposition 2 has several implications. First, even 
though liquidity needs are stochastic in this environment 
(because equity, whose value is stochastic, can be used 
alongside money as a means of payment), a determin-
LVWLFPRQH\VXSSO\VHTXHQFHFDQVXI¿FHWRLPSOHPHQW
a zero nominal rate in every state of the world. Second, 
even within the class of deterministic monetary policies, 
there is a large family of policies that can implement 
the Pareto optimal equilibrium. Finally, it would be im-
SRVVLEOHIRUVRPHRQHZLWKDFFHVVWRD¿QLWHWLPHVHULHV
for the path of the money supply to determine whether 
an optimal monetary policy is being followed. On the 
other hand, a single observation of a positive nominal 
UDWHFRQVWLWXWHVGH¿QLWLYHHYLGHQFHRIDGHYLDWLRQIURP
an optimal monetary policy.Asset Prices, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy
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Positive Results: Interest-Rate 
Targets and Asset Prices
In this section I consider perturbations of the optimal 
monetary policy that consist of targeting a constant 
positive nominal interest rate. I also discuss some of 
the positive implications of changes in the nominal 
LQWHUHVWUDWHWDUJHWIRUWKHLQÀDWLRQUDWHHTXLW\SULFHV
and equity returns. To this end, it is convenient to focus 
on a recursive formulation in which prices are invari-
ant functions of the aggregate state stt t xM = (, ) ,  i.e., 
I I t
ss
t = () , s I I t
mm




t = ( ( ), ( )), OO ss  where 
Os
t () s =   Ux x t
s
tt () [() ] I s  and Om
t () s =  Ux t
m





tt M   OO () () . ss  Also, restrict attention to 
stationary monetary policies, i.e., P :,   \  so that 
Mx M tt t + = 1 P() .  To illustrate the main ideas as simply 
as possible, the following proposition specializes the 
analysis to the case of independently and identically dis-
tributed dividends and liquidity constraints that would 
bind with probability one at every date in the absence 
of money.
PROPOSITION 3. Assume dF x x dF x (,) () .   Let l() G =
1  DDG uq () *  and G be defined by l() / . GE =1
Let  GG 0 1 (,)be given, and suppose that  B  [1
E GG lq () ] . *
00 Then for any GG [, ] , 0 1 there exists a 
recursive monetary equilibrium under the monetary 
policy
































( () ( )
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    xx U x
The equilibrium prices of equity and money are














(8) IG m(;) s =















   

 1
Together with (3), the asset prices (7) and (8) imply that 
the monetary policy (6) induces an equilibrium gross 
nominal interest rate that is constant (independent of s)
and equal to l() G 1 (with equality only if G =1). The 
function PG (; )  GH¿QHVDFODVVRIPRQHWDU\SROLFLHVLQ-
dexed by the parameter G, which effectively determines 
the level of the constant nominal interest rate implement-
ed by the policy. According to (8), real money balances 
and the value of money are decreasing in the nominal 
interest-rate target (increasing in G ). According to (7), 
under the proposed policy, the real price of equity is 
increasing in the nominal interest-rate target (decreasing 
in G ). As GG  11 ,() , l  and therefore (according to 
Proposition 1) the policy PG (; ) x  approaches an optimal 
policy under which the recursive monetary equilibrium 
decentralizes the Pareto optimal allocation.
Notice that Is x (;) 1  is the equilibrium equity price 
that would result in a Lucas (1978) economy with no li-
quidity needs. Therefore, the fact that II G ss xx (;) (;) 1 <
for all x and any GG [, ) 0 1  implies that deviations from 
the optimal policy raise real asset prices above the value 
WKDWD¿QDQFLDODQDO\VWZRXOGFDOFXODWHEDVHGRQWKHH[-
pected stream of dividends discounted by the stochastic 
discount factor of Lucas’ model, E   Ux U x tt () / ( ) . 1
On average, liquidity considerations generate a 
negative relationship between the nominal interest rate 
DQGWKHLQÀDWLRQUDWHDQGHTXLW\UHWXUQVLIWKHWDUJHW
nominal rate, l() , G 1 LVKLJKHUWKHDYHUDJHLQÀDWLRQ
rate is higher, real money balances are lower, and the 
liquidity return on equity rises, which causes its price 
to rise and its measured real rate of return to fall. In-
tuitively, a higher nominal interest-rate target implies 
that buyers are on average short of liquidity, so equity 
becomes more valuable as it is used by buyers to relax 
their trading constraints. This additional liquidity value 
FDXVHVWKHUHDO¿QDQFLDOUHWXUQRQHTXLW\WREHORZHURQ
average, at a higher interest rate.
Proposition 3 also shows explicitly how monetary 
policy must be conducted in order to support a recursive 
monetary equilibrium with a constant nominal interest 
rate (with the Pareto optimal equilibrium in which the 
nominal rate is zero as a special case): the growth rate 
of the money supply must be relatively low following 
states in which the real value of the equilibrium equity 
holdings is below average. Equivalently, the implied 
LQÀDWLRQUDWHZLOOEHUHODWLYHO\ORZEHWZHHQVWDWHx and 
a next-period state   x , if the realized real value of the 
equilibrium equity holdings in state x is below the state-x




I have presented a simple version of a prototypical 
search-based monetary model in which money coexists 
ZLWKD¿QDQFLDODVVHWWKDW\LHOGVDULVN\UHDOUHWXUQ,Q
this formulation, money is not assumed to be the only 
asset that must, nor the only asset that can, play the role 
of a medium of exchange: nothing in the environment 
prevents agents from using equity along with money, 
or instead of money, as a means of payment. Since the 
equity share is a claim to a risky aggregate endowment, 
WKHIDFWWKDWDJHQWVFDQXVHHTXLW\WR¿QDQFHSXUFKDVHV
implies that they face aggregate liquidity risk, in the 
sense that in some states of the world, the value of 
equity holdings may turn out to be too low relative to 
what would be needed to carry out the transactions that 
require a medium of exchange. This seems like a natural 
starting point to study the role of money and monetary 
policy in providing liquidity to lubricate the mechanism 
of exchange in modern economies.
In this context, I characterized a large family of 
optimal monetary policies. Every policy in this family 
implements Friedman’s prescription of zero nominal 
interest rates. Under an optimal policy, equity prices and 
returns are independent of monetary considerations. I 
have also studied a class of monetary policies that target 
a constant but nonzero nominal interest rate. For this 
perturbation of the family of optimal policies, I found 
that the model articulates the idea that, to the extent 
WKDWD¿QDQFLDODVVHWLVYDOXHGDVDPHDQVWRIDFLOLWDWH
transactions, its real rate of return will include a liquid-
ity return that depends on monetary considerations. As 
a result of this liquidity channel, persistent deviations 
from the optimal monetary policy will cause the real 
prices of assets that can be used to relax borrowing or 
other trading constraints to exhibit persistent deviations 
from their fundamental values.
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